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Recent American events have tended to energize me and remind me of a wider swath about our 
circumstances. We find ourselves fighting this issue on methodological, epistemological, and 
ontological grounds, but it is also a matter of power and market driven distortions, of issues of 
gender and how marginalization works to blame precisely those it then victimizes, and on and 





Hermeneutics, hermeneutic research, qualitative research, interpretive research, neo-
conservativism, research funding, dominant cultures 
 
 
Who wants yesterday’s papers?  
Nobody in the world. 




One characteristic of a dominant culture is that, because of its dominance, it no longer needs to 
give an account of itself or be concerned with its warrantability. It becomes the silently taken-
for-granted “way things are” that, in relation to which, warrant is decided and determined. 
Research, publication, funding schemes, even the categories of the forms one fills out, are 
unquestioningly based on the presumptions and requirements of natural scientific research. It is 
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not simply that funding is difficult to secure for interpretive work. It is that the very means of 
such securing are already, at the outset, cast against its case. 
 
More buried that this, however, and far more pernicious, is another level of dominance: the 
presumptions and procedures of quantitative research have come to define anything that does not 
fall in line with those lines of dominance. Under the shadow of quantitative research, qualitative 
research is said to be about subjectivity, about telling your story, about making things up, about 
being unaccountably mushy and vague and undisciplined, about being irrelevant and self-
involved, overly poetic, emotional, uninformed, having no proof (Moules, Venturato, Laing, & 
Field, 2017, p. 3), no generalizability, no reliability. It has little hope of publication. Not of 
practical use. Not of interest to readers (Moules et al., 2017, p. 1). It is not especially fundable 
because it does not cleave to the dominant, recognized, and condoned fundamentals.  
 
Interpretive research is, then and of course, treated as an object of weird suspicions, like a sort of 
cultish faith object, something lurking furtively in some liminal space outside the confines of the 
surveillances we’ve come to presume. It is out in the fields (Latin paganus), trod the way of 
heathens, uncivilized, witches work with familiar cats.  
 
So, quantitative research not only “dominates the scene” (Gadamer, 1986, p. 59) but, not 
coincidentally, has the character of “seiz[ing] upon and dominat[ing] things [with a] will-to-
control” (Gadamer, 1977, p. 227), thus casting its own shadow over that which slips out of its 
purview. The dominating character of quantitative research thus provides an equally dominant 
caricature of any alternative to it. 
 
Sad to say, over many long years, I’ve seen purportedly “interpretive” work that has fallen hook, 
line, and sinker for this degrading, bullying caricature, and seen good hearted scholars get caught 
in the exhausting, unbecoming, and humiliating mugs-game of attempting to refine and upgrade 
the contours of this caricature, only to then get bowled over, over and over again, by stinging 
questions posed often out of sheer, I dare say deliberate, ignorance. More than once over thirty 
plus years, I have encountered people in positions of power (for example, external examiners on 
Ph.D. examinations), literally say, “Well, I’ve never heard of hermeneutics!” and who then take 
that statement as a fully adequate account of why no more needs to be said. Students and 
scholars alike are then asked to give, over and over and over again, a detailed descriptions of a 
long and publically available history of interpretive work stretching back, in places, to Aristotle, 
even to Heraclitus, and up through the humanist tradition first wrought at the advent of modern 
science in 17th century Europe, into late-19th century European contestations and detailed 
quarrels and concerns over the nature and limits of the human sciences, up through 
phenomenology, hermeneutics, into long and complex streams of refinement and differentiation 
over the course of the 20th and 21st century. And all this is the family tree, of course, to 
contemporary questioning of the value of “the humanities” in a world which is dominated by 
market-driven concerns for profitability, and which scoffs as any turbid and turgid and time-
wasting suggestions of the cultivation of character, thoughtfulness, and poise.  
 
And those demanding this account, over and over again, have no qualms in not remembering any 
of this the next time questions are raised regarding the legitimacy of interpretive work.  
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Such is the character of dominance.  
 
Only those marginalized need to remember what has happened. Those who are part of the 
dominant culture can always plead innocence without consequence. Those marginalized must 
remember their own bloodlines as well as those of the forces of marginalization. The dominant 
need remember neither.  
 
Dominance is somnambulant and forgetful by nature, but it sleepwalks and stalks.  
 
How’s that for “poetic?” It surely bodes that we are dealing with far more here than matters of 
research methods. It is no coincidence that First Nations are speaking up in this fray, that 
ecological beckonings to heed what lies beyond our will to dominate are becoming increasingly 
urgent, that those excluded want “in” on what it means to be us.  
 





Those who have become marginalia to the dominant text have always murmured and have been 
repeatedly turned into a dirty little secret that might go away if we ignore it again. There is a war. 
It is nothing new. And the quiet urgency of fighting it remains steady and true. Make no mistake. 
This goes well beyond issues of “research methods.” 
 
What is at stake in the marginalization of interpretive research is whether scholars have the 
freedom, and the intellectual and spiritual responsibility, to explore the lives, often “the pain” 
(Sanders, 2016), of teachers, of students, of nurses and patients, and parents, and so on. These 
varied and varying explorations come via the tough, sometimes vague and nebulous, sometimes 
contradictory, doorstep stories that are told, voices caught in the confines, for example, of school 
hallways, stuck, equally, in the confines of the unvoiced and often unvoiceable ways in which 
schools have been shaped and thus shape teachers and students alike. Likewise, parents who, in a 
moment of profound breathlessness, entrust their only child into the maw of medicalization. Or 
who know in advance that they will outlive them. Or who tiptoe their child behind the 
schoolyard gate and then have an unrecognizable child read back to them by the regnant regimes 
of schooling that often brook no quarter of response.  
 
The job of interpretive research is to go out into the wild “with [a] readiness to be ‘all ears’” 
(Gadamer, 2007a, p. 189) and to gather what we can of the suffering of our living, the language 
that is used, the images that arise and fall, how and when the joy outbursts, the secrets, the 
hushed-ness of ordinary life lived. Interpretive work is then charged with trying to give those 
stories a voice, to “[make] the text[s]…speak” (Gadamer, 2007b, p. 189) by linking them up to 
the lifelines of the world, to the images and ideas and ancestries that we have variously inherited, 
so that their deep resonances can be made conscious. This is our work, as scholars, to search and 
re-search these mixed and convoluted inheritances for tales anciently told, for ancestors that have 
spoken and written about the matters at hand, so that the doorstep tale becomes a gateway into a 
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larger life, a larger living, a larger commiseration, and I can experience the confines of my own 
telling opening up beyond the stifle of my own joys and sorrows: 
 
I don’t want to “tell my story.” I want to be relieved of it by going to a place (ecos -, 
topos -/topica -) where I can meet others who can read me back to myself from beyond 
my own failings and limits and delusions, beyond the story I’ve presumed. (Jardine, 2016, 
p. xvi) 
 
Interpretive work is charged with not cleaning these stories up, blunting their sting, making them 
palatable, non-contradictory, smooth and easy. It is charged, instead, with “restoring life to its 
original difficulty” (Caputo, 1987, p. 2), a restoration that is necessary because of the oppression 
and repression of the suffering and hope of, well, all of us, under falsely assuring rubrics and 
cold steel confidences and marketing gimmicks that want to hear nothing of our living and dying.  
  
Through such bringing-to-awareness of the messes we are in, there is the possibility of some 
relief from, or at least some possibility of commiseration over, the only-seemingly-binding 
character of our living and our lives by studying the fabric of the world in which we are living 
and of which my own tale is simply a part: 
 
This fabric is more abundant, more forgiving and generous and difficult than any one of 
our lives alone can measure, so, in exploring these things, in studying thus in the 
presence and grace of each other, I can be relieved of some narrow confine of my “self” 
by working it out, not simply working on it. This is why [interpretive work] feels 
spacious even when that fabric binds and pulls at my attention. (Jardine, 2016, p. xv) 
 
Let’s be blunt, then: “the aim of interpretation, it could be said, is not just another interpretation 
but human freedom” (Smith, 1999c, p. 29), hard-won and always in need of re-winning. As goes 
an old hermeneutic saw, every text, every tale told, can be read as the answer to a question that 
could have been answered differently and therefore, every reading of every text is possible, not 
necessary, thus issuing a sort of relief from what appears to be intransigent, dominant confines. 
The life-world is interpretable.  
 
Interpretive work, therefore, is precisely of “practical value” (Moules et al., 2017, p. 1). It is why 
Hans-Georg Gadamer named hermeneutics a “practical philosophy” (2007a) with a “practical 
task” (2007c), because it casts us back into the trouble of living now having seen through and 
broken the spell of the dominant surface stories that have held us in thrall. When it is well done, 
it is “of interest” (Moules et al., 2017, p. 1) to readers precisely because it is about their lived 
experience of being-in-the-middle-of-things (Latin, inter + esse). 
 
I’m here reminded of an image from David G. Smith that I’ve often cited, that casts this in light 
of his and my common work in pedagogy, in schools: “whether . . . life itself has a chance, or 
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III 
 
Instead of taking on the terribly difficult work of venturing, deliberately and with all the poise 
that scholarship helps us muster, into the roil of living, those of us involved in interpretive 
research seem stuck, again and still, like recent elections have demonstrated, with having to 
spend our time going to fund-raising dinners that seem bent on ignoring those doorstep voices, 
those haunts of lives, in favour of kowtowing, as Moules et al. show so well, to what wealthy 
donors want and how they want it served up: “an ordering of things according to the wishes, 
prejudices, or promptings of the powerful” (Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 261). We seem stuck, more 
than ever, with giving an account of what we are doing in such pernicious detail that we have 
little time to do any of the slow, meticulous work of thinking, of listening, of reading through the 
life and language we have inherited and the ancestors and elders who whisper, and therefore 
reading the world more acutely as a consequence.   
 
That is not what those invested in the status quo want. They want work that is compliant of this 
status. They do not want the suffering of life to become legible, especially to those who are 
suffering and who, in being asked to speak to their lives, just might have the chance to raise their 
heads out of the tangles when they realize what has been perpetrated, how they have been had by 
what passes for “the real world,” for being “just the way things are.” 
 
When such ideas were posed to an exhausted high-school teacher, he said of his hurry and 
exhaustion,  “this is the real world.” He was, at first, shocked to hear my answer: 
 
The world of schooling is not “the real world.” It is just how the world has thus far 
happened to turn out, and the causes and conditions of such turning can be understood, 
unraveled, and we can unravel ourselves from this turning and, in small, sometimes quite 
meager and temporary ways (given the largeness of the looming of things), take a breath. 
This experience is immediate and intimate, but it takes repeated practice and hard study 
to release and realize this immediacy, and even then it is not released once and for all and 
it is easily and understandably frightened off. As the exigencies of every life rise up, so, 
too, rises up the tendency to retrench, harden and once again conceal. (Jardine, 2016, pp. 
xvi-xvii) 
 
Once I can get some distance from the doorstep of my own exhaustion, a glimpse is possible (a 
glimpse, daresay, that is precisely and deliberately prevented by the regimes of exhaustion 
themselves). The efficiency movement (Jardine, 2016, pp. 179-192; Kanigel, 2005; Taylor, 1903, 
1911), which took hold of education early in the 20th century, demands and produces exhaustion 
and rush in order to keep workers in line. Thus, intimacy of this teacher’s expression of his lived-
experience, in such an exchange, gets both confirmed and denied. His exhaustion seems even 
closer at hand, and, at the same time, he is allowed to experience some wider, more hidden truth 
about the arrival of his circumstances, a truth that was being blocked by the flat declarations 
about “the real world.” What he is experiencing is now experienced as possible (having arisen 
from causes and conditions that are not permanent and fixed) but not necessary (not just “the real 
world”). It is, that is, interpretable. This, of course, can increase one’s sorrow, finding out that 
the conditions of exhaustion remain dominant even though that dominance is now transparent. 
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As David Smith once said to me, interpretive work is not designed to give you a good night’s 
sleep. 
 
And when that high school teacher decried the lack of initiative in his students, I cited the 
originator of that very same efficiency movement, Fredrick Winslow Taylor (who was hired by 
the United States Department of Education to re-think schools and make them more efficient): 
“we do not ask for the initiative of our men. We do not want any initiative. All we want of them 
is to obey the orders we give them, do what we say, and do it quickly” (cited in Kanigel, 2005, p. 
169, emphasis is mine). So, the intimately experienced lack of initiative of students is not just a 
subjective report by a particular teacher, nor is it simply a property of “kids these days.” In 
interpretive work, it is treated as a potential herald of multiple threads that have come to bind our 
living. To caricature it as “his subjective opinion,” or to pin it on the wantonness of today’s 
youth, are outrageous and profoundly illiterate attempts to marginalize these doorstep tales in 
precisely those ways that wish to keep them impotent and compliant and obedient and silent, that 
wish to prevent them from being interpreted as perhaps insightful about our circumstances and 
what we have forgotten. Ask: Who profits from the exhaustion of teachers, of scholars? Who 
benefits from the well-trained compliance of students entering the world? Who finds it 
worthwhile that a student learns full well that the only real question is “Tell me exactly what you 
want and I’ll do it”? Dominance.  
 
So, could this high-school teacher’s statement have been interpreted differently? Of course. 
Welcome to the tough work of interpretation that must, as part of its work, always try to make 
the case for why it makes the case the way it does, thereby sharpening and critiquing its own 
presumptions in light of the object being investigated and the ever-new circumstances of its 
appearance. What becomes visible that was once occluded? What is remembered in such an 
interpretation that has been forgotten? What now seem to be a living issue rather than something 
over and done with and dead? (see Moules, 2015). Under the heading of interpretive research 
there is a whole unruly family of ways to take up these questions of waking up and clarifying the 




Is it Really “Yesterday’s War”? What Gadamer Has to Say About What Gets Counted thus raises 
and goes well beyond issues of “research methods.” But it is also about research and its ways and 
presumptions. As it articulates so well, there are very complex ontological and epistemological 
issues involve in this reputed war over research paradigms. That it could arise all over again as if 
we had never been through this before is one more example of that old adage, that when those 
who fought the war before and won the peace die off or fade from view, the prospects of a new 
war that remembers nothing of its cost, increase.  
 
I want to add to this conversation about these ontological and epistemological issues by thinking 
more about the object of investigation in interpretive work. Qualitative and quantitative research 
are not warring over different ways, different methods, differing criteria of how to properly 
approach the same object. The object of each is different and each, I suggest, tries to measure up 
properly to its own. 
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The object of investigation in qualitative research is not a “thing” with properties to be 
discovered and named under regimes of “control, prediction and manipulation” (Habermas, 1972, 
p. 21), but is, rather, a long and contested, and emergent lineage of images, ideas, choices, 
possibilities, occlusions, inclusions, victories, defeats, silences and voices. The suffering of a 
young child, or the effort to learn to pronounce a new word (Jardine, 2016, pp. 290-291), for 
example, is not a separately determinable object that somehow “is what it is” and is then, post 
hoc, voiced in various ways, seen from various perspectives, such that we could then somehow 
compare this variety to this pre-determined object. The object being considered by interpretive 
work is that very various-ness. “Only in the multifariousness of voices does it exist” (Gadamer, 
1989, p. 284). And that variousness varies over time. This is its emergent, living, contested, 
nature. This is the “real world” of the life-world, to be thus. This is why Gadamer (1989) cites 
the examples of law and art in order to try to get hold of the character of knowledge in 
interpretive work. In the law, a new case does not just fall under an old law, but calls that law to 
account for its governance. Cases – those doorstep stories – are thus “fecund” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 
36). “Interpret[ing]” such cases is “the furthering of an event that goes far back” (p. xxiv), 
summoning precedents or using old images or new nuances, unearthing the work, say, of F.W. 
Taylor, and making the case for this surrounding of the case of a tale told in a high school 
hallway. The object under investigation in interpretive work is thus part of a living tradition, as is 
that interpretive work itself. As with, for example, the history of visual art, the arrival of Picasso 
is not just the addition of one more case that falls under already-established rules and 
expectations governing “art history and technique.” The arrival of his work induced the 
disturbing, contentious disestablishing of those very rules and expectations, and then, of course, 
had a hand in the slow reestablishment of that very history, now revived by a new arrival, now 
no longer the tradition it seemed to have been. New things become precedents that were 
heretofore simply ignored or lost to memory. Different things become “old fashioned” or no 
longer done. Things that were once silent start speaking up. This is “the real world” of a living 
tradition in the life world, and to expect to have the fixity prerequisite of an object of the natural 
sciences is to violate what it is.  
 
We can read of a teacher who speaks of the experience of having a dying child in their Grade 
Two classroom and helping the children learn to live with this reality and to learn to live with it 
herself (see Molnar 2016). We can recoil in witness of the case being made that the 
developmental readers used in schools (so ordinary, so de rigueur in their dominance of 
classroom practices in the early grades) have an affinity to issues of colonialism and the loss of 
the tracks of one’s people (Tait, 2007). Someone else writes of the loss of her cousin, Shelby, to 
cancer (Latremouille, 2014) and the parent of a child of the same fate, writes in response (see 
Jardine 2014a, p. 1), and this beckoned me to suggest that “this is why we read. This is why we 
write” (Jardine, 2014b). The investigation of such things must itself not demand that these things 
be differently than they are. 
 
This is why I hold this difficult passage from Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989) so near and dear: 
 
Knowledge [in interpretive work] is not a projection in the sense of a plan, the 
extrapolation of the aims of the will, an ordering of things according to the wishes, 
prejudices, or promptings of the powerful; rather, it remains something adapted to the 
object, a mensuratio ad rem. [This, please note, is true of and apparent in the natural 
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sciences as well as the human sciences. However, the object of the natural sciences is a 
different object, and therefore the measure of its adaptation is different; see below] Yet 
this thing [in the human sciences] is not a factum brutum [a “brute fact” that “is what it is,” 
thus laying out the task, in the natural sciences, of finding and pinning down what it is] 
but itself ultimately has the same mode of being [being human]. [In the human sciences] 
neither the knower [the one doing interpretive research] nor the known [the object being 
interpreted] is “present-at-hand.” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 261) 
 
A tough read, especially for anyone who thinks that, in interpretive work, you just get to say 
what you think and make things up.  
 
Here is an elaboration of this passage, including a slightly different and illuminating translation 
of some of these thoughts. In interpretive work: 
 
Both the one who understands and the thing that is understood “are” historically, that is, 
in the process of unfolding themselves over time, and neither the one who understands 
nor the thing understood “are” statically present [-at-hand] independently of each other. 
Both “are” in their interactive development. Hence, understand is still a mensuratio ad 
rem, as Gadmaer puts it, or, in another traditional formulation, an adaequatio intellectus 
ad rem, except that the “adequation” of the intellect, its measuring and fitting of itself, is 
never to a timeless thing that always is what it is, some brute fact, “determinable” and 
independent of the one who knows it [or the lived circumstances in which that knower 
lives – knowing of Picasso, e.g., is no what it used to be]. Hence, I suggest that we might 
better speak of a reciprocal adaequatio intellectus et rei, of the temporary adequation of 
two entities, intellect [me attempting to hear of this teacher’s experiences with the full 
weight of what I know of our shared and contested intellectual ancestries] and thing [this 
story, here, now, pleading both up out of and to that ancestry], to each other, each in their 
particular historical development at the given time. (Smith, 2011, pp. 24-5) 
 
Part of interpretive work involves reading these passages of Gadamer’s and Smith’s with all the 
open-eared audacity that we try to give to our so-called “participants” in a research study, 
because each of these clusters of texts (“the literature,” the interpreter’s background study of the 
phenomenon being investigated, and the “data” [interviews, transcripts, anecdotes, written 
missives from participants, and so on) must learn to speak to one another if the interpretive study 
is to be successful. Each clarifies and expands the other and frees it from its limitations. Each 
relieves the other. The literature relieves the doorstep tale of its “my story”-ness by reading it out 
into a world of lost relations and occluded ancestries; and the doorstep tale relieves the literature 
of its moribund erudition and danger of closing the case, by calling it to account, here, now, the 
door just ajar.  
 
Interpretive work therefore tends to sometimes be hesitant and indirect, not in an attempt to 
obfuscate an object that is itself clear, but in order to bring out the obtuse and myriad and 








After all, who is to say once and for all what might become of grief and how we live with it and 
talk about it and hide it and suffer it as the world shifts around us? Who would have thought that 
this war would have reared up again and we’d have to parse our way through it all over again? 
 
Years ago, in an informal conversation with Hans-Georg Gadamer in his office at McMaster 
University, he told me that the care-laden work of interpretation is “internal to Being-in-the-
world -- a process of inner clarification – rather than its domineering father” (Jardine, 2015, p. 
16), and it has taken, it still takes some doing to learn to live with this gentle, encouraging 
admonition. Interpreting our living is what living does all by itself. It is not the property of 
research. Research is one of its cousins, one of its specialized forms. And, as David G. Smith 
quipped years ago, once you kick the old man out of the house who could domineer over these 
matters of living, now what are you going to do? 
 
You can rest assured that there is no unifying methodology or realm of concern or emphasis or 
unanimity in interpretive work itself. It is quite akin to a family gathering whose kinships and 
claims to lineage and importance and urgency are always up for debate, the sort debates that only 
gatherings of relatives can betray. 
 
You can rest assured, as well, that some in this gathering will find this paper far too heated, 
while others will find it timid and cowardly.  
 
Welcome to the life world, then, and to the unfortunate circumstance that always faces those 
marginalized, of being asked to fight a war premised on thin air. How about this? Welcome, 
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